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Abstract
Incremental innovations reinforce the capability of established organizations, while radical innovations cause firms
to develop new technical and commercial skills. In this paper, we will present the results of an exploratory study
examining the technologydiffusion process associated with eleven different systems initiatives iii eight organizations
and suggest that. in addition to the important distinctions the technology life cycle model provides, another useful
perspective is that one differentiates the innovation based on its scale and scope. We will present the findings of
this exploratory research and suggest that to successfully diffuse projects of different scale and scope requires the
building of differentiated project selection processes mid criteria, organizational structures and management
involvement. As a first step in this process, we propose classifying RaD initiatives based on scale and scope and
suggest that this classification will enable managers to identify and establish appropriate managerial and
organizational processes that will facilitate the technology diffusion.
1. INTRODUCTION differentiates the innovation based on the dimensions of scale and
scope. Drawing on the work of konard-Barton (1988) and Katz
The diffusion of a new technology is a complex process that has and Shapiro (1986), we use scale as a measure of the multi-
been usefully described applying a life cycle model to track the department applicability of an innovation as well as a measure
stages of the innovation's development, growth, maturity and of the technology's "network externality" (Katz and Shapiro
eventual decline (Rogers and Shoemaker 1962). An outgrowth 1986), that is, the degree to which ali organizational subunit's
of the life-c*le model has been the differentiation of innovations benefit is dependent on adoption throughout the organization. We
based on whether they represent a radical new idea, and thus a use scope as a measure of strategic focus (Porter 1990; Quinn
new life-cycle, or whether an innovation is an incremental 1992 ) and the degree to which the innovation leverages the
improvement building on existing technology (Henderson and unique core competency of the firm. We have applied these two
Clark 1990). The motivation for distinguishing between radical parameters to construct a conceptual framework to guide this
and incremental innovation has been the clear evidence that the exploratory research (see Figure 1). Our firidings suggest that
organizational capabilities required for each differ sharply the organizational capabilities required for successful technology
(Nelson and Winter 1982; Mansfield 1977; Utterback 1994). diffusion are strongly influenced by the scale and scope of the
Incremental innovations reinforce the capability of established innovation just as they are by its life cycle stage.
organizations, while radical innovations cause firms to develop
new technical and commercial skills. We began our investigation of technology diffusion strategies by
studying eleven different systems initiatives in eight organizations.
tn this paper , we will present the results of an exploratory study The sample was drawn by convenience and the research
examining the technology diffusion process and suggest that, iii undertaken through the cooperation of academics and
addition to the importailt distinctions the technology life cycle practitioners who focused on the problem of identifying
model provides, another useftil perspective is one that
organizational processes and procedures that would promote
technology diffusion.
141
In this paper we will present the results of the research and a characteristics." Her findings indicate that an innovation's
synopsis of three case studies that represent the range of different complexity as tileas ired by "the number of people affected by the
initiatives that we examined across the two parameters of scale introduction of an innovation and the number of different
and scope. We will then map the case studies onto this organizational subuiiits that tile innovation cuts across" increases
conceptual framework and attempt to address some of the issues the challenges faced by managers in choosing an implementation
associated with choosing an appropriate technology transfer strategy.
strategywithin the constraints of the technology's characteristics
and the organizational context. Fichman and Kemerer (1993) used similar distinctions when
describing the process of technology transfer for software process
innovations. They note that researchers have typically studied the
adoption decision of individuals or organizations without taking
A U IV into account the network effects of process innovations that cut
UiliCpe Eklsiress Uni*le Eh,sitrss
Kn:,Ate* - Knmle* - across organizational boundaries or require the coordination of
Si :leR*Mlicnor CIOSS 81,11011]1 many subunits. Such innovations are frequently subject to the
1.1
Appacabili y phenomenon described by economists as "network externalities"
or "increasing returns to adoption:"
1 III
Si*iC[1 Ooss Rntion] Increasing returns to adoption means that the benefits
3 &15 App ility of adopting an innovation largely depend on the sizeNot Uiple to Not U*eto (past, present, and future) of the community of other
Ihtsurs alsir= adopters...(the classic example here is the telephone
' network). [Fichman and Kemerer 19931
A[04
Rojea Scale: In such circumstances, the attributes of the innovation, however
Oess Baliom! preferable, may not be enough to guarantee its diffusion. FichmanArvlic*ility
and Kemerer, drawing on the work of Arthur (1987) and Farrell
Dimensions Defined: and Saloner ( 1987), suggest that the introduction of a new
Scope technology can overcome this impediment through strong
1. Core Business Knowledge Leverage: Does the application sponsorship.
support unique business capability? Or does it support a
core competency or strategic purpose (Porter 1990; Quinn Sponsors can lip the cosl benefit equation in favor of the
1992)? new technology by actively subsidizing early adopters
Scale and by setting standards that ensure that a single
2. Cross Functional Applicability: Does the application affect network will emerge around the new technology instead
multiple functions or business units (Leonard-Barton 1988)? of a pastiche of smaller, potentially incompatible
Or does a major benefit of the innovation derive from use by networks.
other subunits or network externalities (Katz and Shapiro
1986; Fichman and Kemerer 1993)? Sponsorship is defined by economists as "making investments
in the form of penetration pricing to establish technology so that
Figure 1. Defining the Dimensions of Scale and Scope such investments can later be recouped by pricing in excess of
marginal costs" (Katz and Shapiro 1986). Leonard-Barton notes
2. BACKGROUND RESEARCH that sponsorship requires the "concentration of power necessary
for breaking stalemates among the various subunit participants."
Building on the work of several researchers ( Rogers 1983;
Kimberly 1981) who noted the distinction between understanding 3. CLASSIFYING INFORMATION SYSTEMS
the technology transfer and diffusion process within PROJECTS FOR EFFECTIVE TECH-
organizational settings and the process of technology adoption by OLOGY TRANSFER STRATEGIES
individuals, Leonard-Barton examined the implementation
characteristics of various technologies and the impact of these
characteristics on the implementation strategies available to
In this study, we wanted to determine if organizations used
managers. She noted that "within an organization, individuals . identifiably different technology diffusion strategies based on the
innovation responses are highly influenced by the way thar complexity of the innovation which we measured using the scale
implementation is managed. However, managers operate within and scope variables as previously defined. To address this issue,
parameters set by the technology's implementation we framed the followilig two research questions:
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1. Do technology transfer strategies coalesce around systems problems are occurring and how they might be solved. If it
initiatives based on determinants of scale and scope'? can'l be used in a year, it is abandoned as too immature or
not appropriate for the environment. (Handwriting
2. For process oriented technologies that have the potential to Recogizition is an exatilple of a technology tliat was evaluated
affect multiple business units or are likely to benefit from as too immature to be effectively deployed within a 12 to 18
increasing returns to adoption, is there an observed behavior month time frame.)
of strong sponsorship?
3. Develop in-house technical expenise so that proprietary
We examined eleven unique illformation technology initiatives knowledge can be retained in-house and not reside with a
focusing on the process of technology diffusion in eight different vendor or consultant.
organizational settings. We developed case studies using
structured interviews as well as more open-ended discussion 4. Work with analysts and modelers during the process so that
questions. In each of the cases, a face-to-face or telephone hand-offto operations can be accomplished more easily. The
interview was conducted with at least two participants. The system must be able to be supported within the existing
interviews and subsequent analyses were extensively reviewed infrastructure.
for accuracy and inclusiveness. The methodology was chosen as
most appropriate for gaining rich information on dynamic 5. Focus on the specific needs of the business and what makes
processes. As Yin (1984) noted, "The ability to conduct six to money within 12 to 18 months for an operating unit. A
ten case studies arranged effectively within a multiple-case design review committee composed of senior managers reviews
is analogous to the ability to conduct six to ten experiments on project proposals and makes the final selection.
related topics." The methodology also directly builds on the work
of Leonard-Barton, who studied fourteen cases in examining Structure of IS and Line Management Interaction: At
implementation characteristics of various technologies within Trading Partners Inc., IS is housed within the Trading Services
organizational settings and the impact of these characteristics on Group which supplies a range of operational, technical and
the diffusion strategies available to managers. systems support to specific line departments within the company
(see Figitre 2). 11)is represents a "grouping by customer" (Nadler
The following section presents a summary of three cases that and Tilshnian 1988) approach that fosters a close working
exemplify the differences that we found both in the scope and relationship between line managers and the IS group.
scale of the projects tuid in the technology transfer processes and
structures embedded in the organization. Process of Deployment and Technology Transfer: Because
of the customer focus grouping of the IS function within Trading
4. THE CASE STUDIES Services, members of the project team described themselves as
having "two bosses" 011 any given project, the senior vice
4.1 Case #1 - Trading Partners Inc. president for the business unit (e.g., Fixed Income) and the senior
vice president ofTrading Services. Because the project selection
The Application: Trading Partners Inc., an international criteria emphasize choosing a low risk technology (i.e., the
brokerage house, began in 1988 with the vision of one of the technology can not be "emergent") with a relatively quick
senior traders to make voice recognition a modality for data entry payback (return 011 investment within 12 to 18 months), the
for trading applications. The first prototype was developed in technology tralisfer process occtirs quickly and within a specified
January of 1988, and installed in the Fixed Income area. After period of time. In terms of the frainework, Trading Partners'
some additional modifications, the technology was successfully technology diffusion process focilses on supporting those
deployed using handsets on traders desks. intiovations that are narrowly focused iii terms of scale and also
Project Selection Process: Trading Partners Inc. has a formal in terms of scope. Tliat is, tile project selection criteria emphasize
project selection process that begins with soliciting project ideas choosing a technology that directly leverages the core competency
from line managers. These ideas are then evaluated using the of the firm and is not dependent 011 cross departmental
implementation or a standardization of platform in order to realizefollowing criteria.
benefit. The project selection process, the structure of the
1. Invest in technologies that are somewhat later than MIS/line relationship and tile technology hand-off to the operating
"emergent" in their life cycle when a demonstration department all work together to insure success in developing,
prototype can be built. transferring atid deploying this particular type of focused
information technology initiative. The diffusion process is largely
2. Move quickly to develop a working prototype that can be put driven hy the innovation's ability to demonstrate a business
out in the business to provide feedback on what real benefit in a fairly short period of time.
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Trading Partners
President
CEO
radingScrvices Fixed Income  Derivative Products
IS and Other
Operations Support
1 \
Derivative Fixcd
Products Income '
Five Direct Reports Organized by Line of Business
Customer Focused Grouping of a range of support services
Figure 2. Trading Partners Inc. Organizational Structure
4.2 Case #2 - Connecticut Mutual Life Structure of IS and Line Management
Interaction:
Insurance Company Implementing the One
Image project required changing the
structure of the IS organization. The first step was to consolidate
all the software programmers, architects and developers into one
The Application: The Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance division called Business and Technology Solutions. By taking
Company embarked on a major business reengineering effort this action, Connecticut Mutual created a core of technically
enabled by the creative use of information technology including
image processing, expert systems and networking. Beginning in
skilled people who could build expertise and reinforce each
July of 1990, the company articulated a vision that Connecticut
others' learning as the compatiybegan its reengineering effort and
Mutual would present "one image" to clients, agents and
the process of uniquely combining imaging, databases and
associates through the use of a "command center" workstation
networking into the information systems architecture. In Nadler
and Tushinan's tenninology, this was "grouping by project"
Ulat would provide on-line access to customer-based rather than where individuals with a variety of technical skills were brought
product-based information. together to focus on creating the technical backbone of the One
The Project Selection Process: Tile primary objectives of
Image project. At the same time, management created cross-
departniental project development teams staffed with both
Connecticut Mutual's top management were reduction of business and IS professionals whose job was to focus on the
operating expenses and improvement of service. The goal of the business and systems requirements to reengineer particular
MIS area was to shift the focus from system maintenance to business processes: "grouping by process."
system development while reducing response time and cost to the
users. The senior VP of Individual Ufe Insurance was the sponsor Process of Deployment and Technology Transfer: The first
of the One Image project and described the situation at step in planning the reengineering effort was to establish a cross-
Connecticut Mutual this way: hinctional coiiunittee of senior executives who met at least twice
a week for two hours to set policies and make decisions around
Life insurance products were becoming increasingly business goals and areas of responsibility. One Senior Vice
complex to administer. The fact that we are in a President described the importance and necessity of this initial
business with shrinking profit margins required us to step:
find a better way to do business. Automating existing
processes just doesn't achieve permanent savings. We The horizontal changes required by a reengineering
had torethink the waywe do business. l'he other reason effort are cross functional and cross departmental and
was that we decided that we really wanted a customer for them to be successful, an attitude of cooperation
focus and to look like one company, not fifteen little among the heads of the departments was required. If
separate ones to our customers.
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we have aproblenj the three of us [Senior VPs] discuss service within a context of prudent cost control. This case
it and are willing to give up a territorial attitude so that describes a customer service initiative called the "audio response
problems can be resolved. For example, we had to system" which provides customers with touch tone access to
decide whether we wanted reinstatements as part of pre- information about account balances and daily price closes and
sale or post-sale support, that ik whether it would be the allows them to execute transactions on their accounts. The
responsibilityofcustomer service or ofthe underwriting system's objective is to help automate some of the customer
departments. Currently both departments are doing service functions previously handled by customer service
reinstatements, alid they will be combined. It means representatives. By integrating Worldwide's "800" telephone
that people have to give up the traditional view of system with a sophisticated computer system, the company
themselves as getting promoted by virtue of how many supplied customers with information automatically. The system
people they have reporting to them. allowed easier access to information and the convenience of
twenty-four hour service while enabling customer service
The initial objective was to fully implement command center representatives to spend more time with individual customers
functionality in one department and have a quick success. It was addressing more complex account needs.
decided that the installation should take place in a department that
was highly visible and critical to the servicing of clients. A n early The Project Selection Process: Worldwide's strategy is to bc
analysis of business processes identified the Check Services custonier ratlier tlian technology driven. 'Ilieir technology strategy
DepaMment for the first installation. The Check Services is to be a "fast follower" rather than a leader in their use of
Department is where payments for policies can be made
technology, preferring to evaluate the success of new technology
automatically using electronic funds transfer from the client's initiatives in other companies before investing. Accordingly,
checking account per written authorization from the client. The
impact to the client and unit cost reductions were the basic criteria project selection criteria reflect the company's desire to
implement technology solutions that are late enough in their lifefor the selection of this department as the first site.
c>cle for outsourcing to be a viable option while still providing
The success of this system was dramatic: reducing the backlog a return on investment. Worldwide's project selection criteria in
from three weeks to two hours and greatly improving the quality terms of business benefit and time frame were very similar to
of customer service. The success in Check Services created those used by Trading Partners.
pressure to expand the new system since other non-image
departments were no longer able to share documents with the Structure of IS and Line Management Interaction: The in-
Check Services Department. The result was the beginning of re- house IS organization at Worldwide consists of one manager and
engineering in five business groups almost immediately after the eight profussionals who work closely with line managers in
Check Services Department installation started. helping them define their technology needs. As in the Trading
Partliers case, tlie IS function is also part of a larger organization
In this case the technology diffusion process began with called Mutual Funds Services which provides a wide variety of
organizational restructuring. Business returns required that a operational and technical support to Customer Service and
critical mass of users be established and, as Fichman and Kemerer Mutual Funds managers, However, because of Worldwide's
suggested, this required strong sponsorship, with a "concentration technology strategy to be a "fast follower," the company hasofpower required to break stalemates" (Leonard-Barton 1988).
This was accomplished through the establishment of the cross-
concentrated its resources on identifying and managing the
functional committee of senior executives who met on a weekly
integration of outsourced systems rather than on developing in-
basis. In terms of tile framework, this innovation affected house expertise in specialized areas of application development
multiple departments and, as the Check Services example and support.
demonstrates, major benefits were to be derived froin the
networking and standardization that would occur as the initiative
Procee of Deployment and Technology Transfer: The Audio
spread throughout the company. This was an innovation that we Response system was developed for Worldwide by an
ranked highly on both scale and scope measures: it is very high independent vendor who provided a turnkey solution for
in supporting the core competency of the business and very high Worldwide both in terms of hardware and software. The system
as an increasing returns to adoption innovation. provided an "800" number with an audio response for customers
desiring answers to simple inquiries regarding fund prices and
4.3 Case #3 Worldwide Mutual Funds yields. Customer adoption was overwhelming. Within a month,
Worldwide doubled call handling from 5,000 to 10,000 calls per
The Application: Worldwide Mutual funds is a diverse financial week. Customers enjoyed the simplicity of the system and the
services company. The company's key competitive strengths are availability of twenty-four hour service (see Figure 3 for a schema
an expertise in investment management and solid customer of lhe system).
145
--
DST
DEC VAX
Kansas City
----- ---
--
IBM IBM
RS6000 RS6000/i
VFE VFE
- - - 1 1
BT-II BT-II BT-II I1 1 1 1
32 lines
32 lines 32 nes 12 lines
12 lines = 120 Lines
Shareholder
Call
AT&T System 85 Megacomm
Phone System
800 Service  
Figure 3. Audio Response System at Worldwide
This was an initiative that had potential for "increasing returns delivers some benefits, even if no further segments are adopted,
to adoption" in that the company's several different mutual funds was found to offer greater opportunities for effect
ive
would likely have benefited from an integrated audio response iniplementation design and was highly correlated with
successful
system while the management of such a system would have been technology transfer in Leonard-Barton's study. Third, the audio
facilitated by standardization. Yet there was no evidence of strong response systein was not at the core of Worldwide's business and
top management sponsorship or aggressive technology push thus while it offered opportunities for improved cus
tomer service,
activities such as those described in the Connecticut Mutual case. it was not part of a larger organizational change e
ffort and did not
Worldwide' s technology selection criteria and its diffusion require the level of sponsorship found at Connecticut Mu
tual.
process more closely mirrored that found at Trading Partners. 5. MAPPING THE CASE STUDIES TO THE
Three principal characteristics differentiated Worldwide's FRAMEWORK: EXAMINING THE
infrastructure investment from that of Connecticut Mutual. First, RESEARCH QUESTIONS
the audio response system was late enough in its life cycle that
industry standards had been established and the development of Applying the scale and scope measures, we mapp
ed the various
an integrated network was possible even if initiatives in other technology initiatives onto the framework to construct t
he
sections of the business were launched separately. Second, and quadrants shown (se
e Figure 4) and to use these as groupings in
partly due to the existence of such network standards, the audio assessing the original research questions. (A brief description
response system could be implemented in a piecemeal fashion that of the eight other case studies not detaile
d in the body of this
allowed for a smaller scale trial of the technology. This paper is included in the appendix). To address the
se questions,
characteristic of "divisibility," which includes the ability to we constructed the following tables listing some of the principal
implement a technology in stages or segments each of which prOJect implementation characteristics.
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The project selection criteria and the estimated time for project Rise,rell & Techidegy [410,111#
completion (Time Frame) were obtained from the project request Divdgitut TnudEr
proposals in all cases except for Connecticut Mutual and Lincoln
Underwriting, where the criteria and time frame were obtained Figure 5. Stages of Internal Technology
from conversations with project managers and systems users. Transfer, Deployment and Diffusion
The technology initiatives were judged as having increasing
returns to adoption based on the original proposal's justification Finally, we exan ined the organizational structure and reporting
and the belief ofproject managers that funding for an initial pilot relationships of IS professionals within each of the projects and
would provide the basis for future implementation efforts in other mapped how these fit into the overall implementation strategy of
units of the organization. each initiative. The tables on the following page show the results
of this mapping.
In assessing the stages of diffusion completed, we drew on the
work of Rogers and Shoemaker to define the stages of 6. EXAMINING THE RESEARCH
implementation as shown in Figure 5. Agreement on these QUESTIONS
definitions and the level of diffusion success for each of the
initiatives was obtained through discussions with business unit
managers, technology managers and in some cases corporate 1. Do technology transfer strategies coalesce around systems
Initiatives based on determinants of scale and scope?funding managers. In cases where assessments of diffusion
success differed, these were noted as "mixed reviews,"
What do the research findings tell us about technology diffusion
In identifying the principal diffusion strategy for each of the strategies'? First since this was an exploratory research study with
initiatives, we categorized the "organizational pull" strategy as a limited sample size, our findings must be viewed within the
one where adoption of the technology beyond a pilot stage is context of h>pothesis generation rather than traditional hypothesis
dependent on the individual adoption decisions of other business testing. Given this caveat, our results do point to patterns of
unit managers who perceive a strong enough comparative organizational structure, project selection criteria and
advantage over existing technology to invest in the innovation. managenient behavior that appear to be associated with the
This is the classic diffusion of innovation model and mirrors the definitions of project scale and scope developed from the
S-curve adoption function tracked by sociologists (Rogers and literature. Our research would seem to indicate that firms who
Shoemaker 1962) and shown in Figure 4. In addition, we noted are successful at diffusing new technologies do apply different
another diffusion strategy "parallel development," where two or technology transfer and diffusion strategies based on scale and
more business units were given funding to develop technologies scope.
and adapt them to a particular organizational setting. The parallel
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Table 1. Quadrant II ProJect Characteristics
Org.
Project Increasing Diffusion Structure/
Selection Time Returns to Stages Diffusion Diffusion Technical
System Criteria Frame Adoption Completed Strategy Success Specialists
Trading ROI 12 to 18 No II, III Org. Pull Yes Group by
Partners months Customer
Table 2. Quadrant I[I Project Characteristics
Org.
Project Increasing Diffusion Structure/
Selection Time Returns to Stages Diffusion DifTusion Technical
System Criteria Frame Adoption Completed Strategy Success Specialists
Technical Feasible 12 to 18 Yes II Parallel Yes - in one Multi-Foci
Retraining Concept months Development unit - not Groups
diffused to
others -
Mixed
Reviews
Non Mining Feasible 12 to 18 Yes I Org. Pull No -Not Group by
Non-Strategic Concept months used Funcdon
World-wide ROI 12 Yes II, III Org. Pull Yes-spread Group by
months to other apps. Customer
Distributed Feasible 12 months Yes It Parallel Yes - to Group by
Text Concept (plans for Develop. Feasibility - Function
III) not diffused
Table 3. Quadrant IV Project Characteristics
Org.
Project Increasing Diffusion Structure/
Selection Time Returns to Stages Diffusion Diffusion Technical
System Criteria Frame Adoption Completed Strategy Success
Specialists
Connecticut Strategic Long Yes II, III, IV Campaign Yes- Multi-Foci
Mutual Business Term Mgt. multiple Groupsinstances
Underwriting Strategic Long Yes II, III, IV Spin-Off Yes - industry Group by
Business Term Separate Co. standard Output
Credit (1) ROI 24 months Yes H Org. Pull No Group byFuncdon
Credit (2) ROI 18 to 24 Yes II, III Org. Pull Yes - one Group by
months area - Mixed Funcdon
Reviews
Software Strategic Long Yes H Separate Mixed Reviews Group by
Code Business Term Group Output
Data Mining Strategic 12 to 18 Yes II, II, IV Campaign Yes - Group by
Strategic Business months Mgt. redefined Outputbusiness
strategy
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The Trading Partners application is a classic example of the The organizational structure Of technical specialists also was
"organizational pull" diffusion associated with the DOI found to be different from those organizational pull innovations
perspective described by Rogers and Shoemaker and Fichman described earlier. In no case did we find the grouping by
and Kemerer. That is, a "niche" technology that is principally customer that facilitated the DOI innovations found in Quadrants
dependent on the atuibutes of the innovation for its adoption. In Il and III. Instead we found evidence that in the three cases
this case, the project selection criteria were based on screening where diffusion had moved into stage IV (Connecticut Mutual,
potential technologies that were beyond the emergent stage of Lincoln Underwriting and Data Mining-Strategic), technical
their life c*le and with a high probability of return on investment. specialists were either grouped by output or, in the case of
The organizational structuring ofthe technical specialists grouped Connecticut Mutual, grouped by output as well as process.
by"customer focus" was a key characteristic in successful project
selection and implementation. The group by customer 2. For process oriented technologies that have the potential to
organization was also found at Worldwide Mutual funds where affect multiple business units or are likely to benefit from
the audio response system, although an infrastructure and increasing retimis to adoption, is there an observed behavior
increasing returns to adoption initiative, was viewed as an of strong sponsorship?
innovation whose adoption by the organization was driven by its
ability to provide a return on investment. The organizational pull We did find evidence of strong sponsorship for those initiatives
approach coupled with the group by customer structure of that had strategic value. We also observed two distinct types of
technical was made possible by modularizing the technology and strong sponsorship actions. The first, campaign management as
implementing it in subunit segments. described in the Connecticut Mutual case, is focused on diffusing
an innovation across several business units to fundamentally
A modular approach was also chosen for other Quadrant III change both the technical and organizational process of doing
initiatives, but in no other case were these coupled with a group business. The second approach is illustrated by the Lincoln
by customer organizational stnicturing of specialists. The "group Underwriting case and the Software Code Reengineering project.
by customer" approach would seem to be an effective Iii both of these cases, a spin-off firm was created with the idea
organizational design for those initiatives that are viewed as of influencing industry standards at the same time that the
traditional DOI "organizational pull" innovations. This finding innovation was being tested within the parent organization. This
is consistent with research done by Blanton, Watson and Moody would appear to be an approach that allows a company to hedge
(1992). Theyexamined the long term support and maintenance its bets while still pursuing the deployment and diffusion of a
of systems in operating business units and found that process innovation that might provide substantial strategic
benefits to tlie finn. As Fichman and Kemerer note, "the primary
Locating IT groups that provide personalized IT support risk associated with early adoption of technologies is being
with groups that provide other types of personalized stranded on a technological 'spur' away from the main track of
support to office workers is more effective in providing technology development." The spin-off approach creates a
service and support than centralizing such groups within vehicle for Inarketing the new idea to the industry and at the same
a separate department. time allows the parent company to work with its spin-off in a kind
of Stage I R&D partnership, reaping the benefits of being early
Project selection criteria that focus on short term and visible in the cycle while keeping an eye on how fast standards are
results are also consistent with the DOI perspective described in changing within the industry so as not to be "abandoned" if the
the literature. technology fails to catch on.
Project selection criteria and the organizational structure of The "increasing returns to adoption" dimension, which is
technical specialists was found to be very different for Quadrant represented by our horizontal dimension "cross functional
IV innovations that were both at the heart of the firm's core applicability" did not appear to be as dominant a determinant of
competence and subject to increasing returns to adoption. 'I'he strong sponsorship behavior as our vertical dimension, core
project selection criteria in allbuttwoof the Quadrant IV projects capahility leverage. Looking at the systems outlined in Figure
was driven by an articulated strategic business need. The two 4. all those in Quadrants III and IV exhibit the characteri StiCS of
Credit applications that were identified as Quadrant IV projects process innovations subject to increasing returns to adoption.
and undertaken with an ROI perspective were also the least Yet, no strong sponsorship strategy was observed in any of the
successful in diffusing throughout the organization. In three of Quadrant III applications. Only those applications that were
the Quadrant IV applications, Connecticut Mutual, The Lincoln viewed as contributing to the company's strategic goals merited
Underwriting System and the Software Code reengineering extensive executive involvement and sponsorship. Perhaps the
project, a much longer time horizon was proposed for review of best exatiiple of this coines from the Data Mining case, where two
the initiative's success. business units in the same company worked together on the
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development of the technology, but only one - the one that 1. Project selection criteria that focus on short term identifiable
perceived the greatest competitive advantage - actually results and exclude very
emergent technologies.
deployed and diffused the technology using a campaign
management style of executive involvement and diffusion. This 2. An organizational structure of technical specialists that is
is consistent with other findings, specificallykonard-Barton, who "grouped by customer" and focused on customer satisfaction
describes the failure of a gelatin processing innovation in this rather than the building of technical expertise.
manner.
3. A project selection process that requires buy-in and budget
Although Solagen was faster and offered superior responsibility by line management facilitates the transfer and
process control and quality predictability, these deployment of these projects.
attributes were not valued enough to warrant the
organizational and technical changes required for For those initiatives that leverage the core competence of the firm
implementation of the new process""the Solagen and benefit from adoption from other subunits or requi
re network
process could not be linked to any currently important exterlialities, strong top management support is required and the
programs of change. initiative is likely to be diffused more rapidly with a "campaign
management" or spin-off approach than through the
Given the description in the Connecticut Mutual case of the depth
organizational pull approach described for traditional DOI
of commitment required to replace an existing technology and innov
ations. Because these innovations are large scale, the firm
business s>stems infrastructure, it is not surprising that companies needs to organize at least some technical specialists who are
would only engage in this level of effort to secure strategic focused on project o
utcome rather than on business unit
advantage or respond to a significant threat. The Connecticut performance. Finally, for the strategic business applications that
Mutual case also reveals the organizational corollary of software we examined, a longer time frame for evaluation and a broader
process innovations: the parallel need for fundamental procedural set of outcome criteria were
developed than for those projects that
andbusiness process redesign. 'Ihis may also help to explain why were more limited in scope.
seemingly advantageous process innovations, such as client server
architecture or object oriented programming simply don't get the A strategy to combat this is divisibility. As noted from
strong sponsorship required for their success. The relentless Worldwide Mutual Funds, breaking the innovation down so as
"campaign" management required to push standardized process to have it adopted iii an organizational pull appro
ach allowed for
oriented innovations across the organization is simply too costly a less risky implementation strategy. As Leonard-Barton notes,
in human and financial resources to merit investment without a "In the 14 cases observed, technology was more successfully
perceived'blockbuster" return. In economists' terms, "making transferred to users, when the potential for divisibility existed and
investments in the form of penetration pricing to establish was recognized, encouraged,
and used as a foundation for
technology so that such investments can later be recouped by implementation process d
esign."
pricing in excess of marginal costs" (Katz and Shapiro 1986).
This would seem to suggest that innovations that require network Organizations clearly h
ave an interest in developing the internal
externality must be intimately linked with the firm's ability to capability to successfully transfer, deploy and diffuse a wide range
achieve competitive advantage. The exception to this is the use of technology initiatives throughout the organization. Our
ofa modularization strategy as evidenced by Worldwide Mutual research indicates that to do so may require the more explicit
Funds. In such instances, infrastructure investments that can be building of differentiated project selection processes and criteria,
segmented to achieve benefit in one unit or phased in over time organizational structures and management involvement, As a
while achieving some measurable benefits at each stage offer first step in this process, we propose classifying R&D initiatives
managers a widerrange of implementation strategies and options. based on the s
cale ancl scope framework described in this paper
and then linking the appropriate managerial and organizational
7. CONCLUSIONS processes required for effective diffusion.
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Appendix
Summary Descriptions of Cases
1. Trading Partners lIne. (Described in the text.)
2. Connecticut Mutual (Described in the text.)
3. Lincoln Underwriting Application: Ihe Lincoln National Risk Management (LNRM) underwriting application is an
example of an information systems initiative that lead to the development of a spin-off business. Lincoln National is one of
the county's major reinsurance companies and as such has developed considerable expertise in underwriting due to the fact
that they are the "insurance company's insurance firm." Lincoln National, using its underwriting expertise, considerable
systems experience and the vision of its senior medical director, was able to develop an underwriting expert system and
establish a separate subsidiary to market the product to other insurance companies. Rather than keeping the system as a
proprietaryin-house application, Lincoln launched a new business that sought to change the standards for all of underwriting
within the life insurance business. In this sense, the spin-off company works with Lincoln Life as a partner in the R&I) stage
of the diffusion process, and has chosen to activelytransfer the technology across the industry rather than focusing exclusively
within their own company.
4. Credit Granting Application (1) - Credit Authorizer: The credit assistatit (CA) application was developed using expert
s tems technology to incorporate key credit rules. Development required the partnering of technical and business people
who were separated geographically. The geographical separation of the key units complicated the process and contributed
to the difficultyof achieving a standardized development process, consistent level of support and maintenance. Additionally,
the systems group did not appear to have the right mix or level of technical skills to take on the full support of the project
once the application had been depto*d. Organizationally, there seemed to be little incentive for systems support personnel
to change in waT that would have been required to achieve the desired level of internal support. This initiative demonstrated
the technical feasibility of the system, but failed to be fully deployed into the operation of the business.
5. Credit Granting Application (2) - Credit Authorizer New Accounts: New Accounts is an R&D project currently at
the deployment stage. 'I'he time frame for the project has been approximately one year. Part of the development success
ofthis project is attributed to the fact that the interested parties were co-located within the same city. 'Ihe development people
have been eager to acquire new skills and have received the support of their managers to change. Such line management
support and a willingness to fund the project has led project managers to be hopeful that, as the project progresses toward
full deployment, the internal systems group will be ready to step up to the challenge of ongoing support and maintenance.
6. Software Code Reengineering: The overall goal of this project is to replace the existing computing infrastructure and put
in place a new architecture that will allow the company to be more responsive to customer's needs for tailored services and
at the same time reduce the cost of processing.
The Software Code Reengineering Project consists of two main components. The structural component entails changing
the actual configuration of the computer/information system(s). The software coinponent addresses the shift from having
programs and utilities written in procedural languages (specifically COBOL) to those generated by CASE tools in object-
oriented languaga/environment.
Ultimately, systems programs and utilities will be designed and implemented using CASE tools. In the meantime, existing
programs and utilities in the "old" system will be ported over to tlie "new" system through the use of Reverse Code
Engineering. This companyhas considered, if the project is successful, creating a spin-off company to sell this process within
their industry. Throughout the development phase, a special unit has been organized and "grouped by outcome" to focus
solelyon getting this project completed. Progress has been slow, however, and the project has fallen behind schedule several
times.
7. Technical Retraining: Originally, retraining efforts across the various business units of this multinational company focused
largely on enrolling staff in classes in new technologies rather than transitioning information systems professionals from
traditional mainframe systerns development to a distributed environment. However, it soon became apparent that workforce
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retraining required an approach that would go beyond specific training classes to support continuous learning for personal
and professional development. Within this context, the retraining tealn focused on creating a skills development methodology
that could be applied across technology platforms and business units.
The "Retraining Strategies R&D Project" was jointly funded by corporate R&D budgets and four operating units. The project
had two distinct phases. Phase I focused on the development of a widely applicable retraining methodology; Phase II
concentrated on testing the methodology within the context of improving distributed systems skills. Phase I was completed
and one operating unit has been testing the methodology.
8. Distributed Text Management Systems: The Distributed Text Management System R&D Project was spearheaded by
one business unit with the participation of two others. The project spanned fifteen months beginning in 1992 and was just
completed in March of 1993. The main objective of this project was to develop a distributed text management capability
that could be used to link field and home offices. This objective was clearly met. The project team was able to integrate
existing, albeit new, software from outside vendors to provide this capability. Feasibility was demonstrated and the next phase
of the project involves deploying within the separate business units.
9. Data Mining: (1) Non-Strategic Business Application: "Prospect Modeling in Parallel" is the name given to the research
and development project designed to utilize neural networks in conjunction with massively parallel computers as a means
of improving target marketing and enhancing prospect modeling. Prospet models are used to determine potential purchasers
of goods and services from a prospect list or data file. This project was designed as a marriage of two complementary
technologies into a single competitive marketing product. The project was developed using resources from two business
units and rapidly moved through the feasibility stage and into the transfer state. However, only the business unit (described
below), who saw the application as contributing to a strategic advantage moved aggressively to fully deploy and diffuse the
technology. In the "non-strategic" business unit, the technology was never implemented.
10. Data Mining: (2) Strategic Business Application: With the assistance of a partnering business unit, the "Prospect
Modeling in Parallel" was demonstrated as a viable concept. The CEO of this business unit was at first very skeptical, but
once he saw that this technology could provide his company with a strategic advantage in garnering customers, he quickly
moved to fullydeploy and diffuse the technology throughout the business. This unit is now enjoying a price premium in its
market due to this technology.
11. Worldwide Mutual Funds (Described in the text.)
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